Mobile device tracking (which phone is connecting, and should it)
Your phone reaches Omniscio with a pairing token, and anything holding that token used to be able to connect with no idea which device it was. Now a new device is named and surfaced, you can block one without re-pairing everything, and a device has to be approved before it can do anything at all.
On this page
What it is
What it is (plain language)
When you turn on Mobile Access, Omniscio gives you a QR code / link secured by a pairing token so your phone can reach your desktop. That token is a bearer credential — until now, anything holding it could connect, with no awareness of which device. Mobile device tracking adds a recognition layer: Omniscio remembers each device that uses your token, trusts your first device silently, and raises an inbox alert the moment a new, unrecognized device connects — so if your token ever leaks, you find out and can act.
Where to find it
Two places: a "New device on your mobile access" inbox alert when an unseen device connects, and the device list behind Mobile Access in Settings, where you approve, block or review devices.
How it behaves
What you see
- A "New device on your mobile access" inbox alert when a device Omniscio hasn't seen before connects with your token. It names what the device looks like (e.g. "A new iPhone just connected…") and — on the desktop — shows the device inline in the inbox with one-click Approve, Trust and Block (and Unblock if it's already blocked), so you act right there without opening Settings; a small Manage devices link jumps straight to that device's row in Settings. It is inbox-only (it does not buzz your phone). On mobile web it shows a "manage on your desktop" note instead (the device controls are desktop-only).
- A Devices card in Settings → Remote Access listing every device that has used the
token: its type/name, richer device detail (browser + operating system, e.g. "iOS 17 ·
Safari"), when it was first and last seen, a network-origin label ("Local network" /
"Tailscale" / "This computer" / "Public internet"), and — when enabled — a coarse location
(city/region/country). Each row has:
- Trust — dismiss the "new" flag on a device you recognize (it won't alert again).
- Rename — give a device a friendly name.
- Block — refuse that one device without kicking everyone off (see below).
- A "Show where devices connect from" toggle (Settings → Remote Access, default ON). It controls the coarse-location lookup: with it on, each phone quietly asks an Omniscio cloud endpoint to turn its own public IP into a rough city/region (the same MaxMind geo engine that powers the "new sign-in location" security emails). Turn it OFF to stop the lookup entirely — the phone then makes NO cloud geo call and the card shows only device detail + network origin.
Where a device is connecting from (location)
The desktop's mobile server only ever sees a private address for a connecting phone (a
home-Wi-Fi 192.168.x, a Tailscale 100.x, or 127.0.0.1 behind the Tailscale proxy, private or public), so it
can't geolocate the phone itself. Instead the phone reports its own location: it fetches its
coarse city/region/country from the resolveMyGeo cloud endpoint (which reads the phone's real
public IP) and sends the result to the desktop over the already-authenticated WebSocket. This
works in every connection mode (a phone always has its own internet), and it's the useful
security signal — a home phone reads as your city; a remote leaked-link phone reads as somewhere
else. Only the coarse location is stored on the device row; the raw IP is never persisted.
How it recognizes a device
Omniscio assigns each device a hidden server-generated id stored in an HttpOnly
cookie (omniscio_device_id), issued the first time a device authenticates over the web
layer. It is not something the phone makes up (so a thief's fresh browser has no cookie
and shows up as new), and it survives your phone hopping between Wi-Fi and cellular (an
IP-based guess would false-alarm constantly). A device that can't carry a cookie falls
back to a coarser fingerprint of its browser + token.
The first device ever seen on a token is trusted silently — it's your existing phone, not "new." Only a second, unfamiliar device raises the alarm. Re-pairing your own device after you regenerate the token does not false-alarm, because the device keeps its stable id.
Blocking vs. regenerating
- Block adds one device to a denylist the server checks at connect time, so that device is refused (on both the normal and the freeze-proof off-loop connection paths) while your other devices keep working — no re-pairing required.
- Regenerate token (in Mobile Access) remains the full kill-switch: it invalidates the token so every device must re-pair. It's the real remedy for a confirmed leak.
- Forget paired devices now also clears the device registry AND the in-memory approval map.
Device approval — the second factor (mobile 2FA)
The tracking above is DETECTION. Device approval is PREVENTION, and it is ON by default: a phone that connects with the pairing token is inert until you APPROVE that device from your signed-in desktop. Every mobile request — reads, actions, AND the live feed, over BOTH the live socket and plain web (HTTP) requests — is refused for an unapproved device, so a leaked pairing token alone can do nothing.
- You approve from the desktop — or with a code when you are away. The "Approve your device" inbox alert shows the device inline with one-click Approve / Block (desktop), and the Devices card has the same Approve / Revoke approval controls; approving is a desktop action (the approve channel is blocked from the phone bridge), so a phone can never approve itself. That desktop step — taken while you are signed into your account — IS the second factor.
- Your existing phones keep working. Devices already recognized are grandfathered in, so you are not locked out on upgrade; a brand-new device needs one approval.
- Only you can grant a device — an AI agent can only ask. An agent working for you can't approve, trust or unblock a device itself (every agent on the computer can reach Omniscio's control server, so it can't stand in for you). When one asks to approve or trust a device, the device's own inbox card appears — one card per device, however often it asks — and nothing changes until you click Approve or Trust in it. An agent can't unblock a device at all: you do that in the device list. Taking access away (blocking, revoking an approval) still works from an agent, since that only makes things safer.
- The phone tells you what's happening. An unapproved phone shows a "waiting for approval" card — approve it on your desktop, or get a code by email and type it there — instead of a silently broken screen; it clears the moment you approve the device. That includes a brand-new device's very first screen: it reads "Approve this device to continue." with the same approve / email-code controls. (Before 2026-10-27 that first screen wrongly said "Sign in from the desktop app" even when the desktop was signed in, and "Check again" could never get past it.)
- An iPad shows up as a "Mac". iPad Safari identifies itself as a desktop Mac browser, so a new iPad appears as a new "Mac" in the inbox alert and the device list. Approve that entry — it is the iPad, not your computer.
- And the desktop never just goes quiet. If nobody is signed in on this computer, approving isn't possible yet — so instead of showing nothing, the same inbox row appears as "Sign in to use mobile access", telling you to sign in here and then approve the device. The card swaps the Approve button for a "sign in on this computer to approve" note (Block still works — blocking never needed an account). Before this, a signed-out desktop meant mobile was completely dead with an empty inbox and no explanation anywhere.
- Your phone can also approve itself — with a code by email. If you are away from your computer when a device needs approval, the waiting phone offers Email me a code. A six-digit code goes to the email on your Omniscio account, and typing it on the phone approves that device exactly as the desktop button would. The code works once, expires in ten minutes, allows five tries, and is never shown in the app or written to a log. Requests are capped per device and per account, so a leaked link cannot flood your inbox. The desktop must be signed in and running, because that is what sends the email; if it is not, the phone says to sign in there first.
- Two toggles (Settings → Remote Access, both default on, both blocked from the command line and from the phone): Require device approval — the master switch, which the signed-in owner can now turn OFF (turning it off asks first and spells out that anyone holding your access link could then read your data while it is off) — and Keep existing devices approved (turn off to make grandfathered devices re-approve — a testing lever).
- Cookie-only + fail-closed. Only a device with a real random
omniscio_device_idcookie is approvable (the coarse UA+token fingerprint is guessable, so it is never authorized); an unresolved device or a signed-out owner is denied. The per-request check is a pure in-memory lookup — no crypto, no network, no per-tap slowdown.
Honest limits
- With Device approval ON (the default), a leaked token alone is useless — the thief's device shows up unapproved and can do nothing (no actions, no live feed, and no reading the bootstrap snapshot or any file/media route over HTTP either) until you approve it from your desktop or with a code by email. The limits below describe the tracking layer on its own.
- With Device approval OFF, the pairing link alone is enough. That is the trade the switch makes: turn it off only while you need your own phone back, and turn it on again afterwards. The one-time code exists so you should not have to make that trade at all.
- Tracking alone is detection, not prevention. A determined thief who clears their cookie reappears as a new device — which simply re-alerts you.
- It defends against the common case (the token alone leaking), not theft of your entire browser session (token and the device cookie together).
- Trust-on-first-use assumes the token isn't already leaked when tracking begins; the auditable Devices list is how you'd catch an unexpected trusted device.
- The shown location is phone-supplied, so a sophisticated malicious client could FORGE it to look local. It is a decision-AID only — the fail-closed device-approval gate never trusts it, so a forged location cannot approve a device (approval is a desktop-only action). The "Show where devices connect from" toggle disables the lookup + hides location entirely.
Related
- mobile-remote-access.md — the phone access these devices are connecting to.
- mobile-remote-access.md — getting a phone connected in the first place.
- inbox-alerts.md — the alert surface the new-device notice arrives on.
Last verified 2026-09-28